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Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) presents new 
paradigms for security and information assurance.  Security 
processes for legacy systems are not sufficient to secure a 
distributed SOA.  Yet, many of the new services arriving at 
the tactical edge for Fleet testing are based on web 
services—meaning that SOA is somewhat inevitable.  This 
paper addresses some of the challenges encountered when 
testing SOA in live Fleet operations and in controlled 
laboratory experiments.  Discussion of SOA capabilities is 
followed by a case study that uses them to determine the 
source of a latency failure under expected user tactical load.  
The case study concerns performance issues encountered in 
both field and laboratory experiments when implementing 
certificates to secure web services in distributed service-




Comprehensive assessment of Service-Oriented 
Architecture (SOA) components, applications and services 
requires operational enterprise-class architecture against 
which to test proposed configurations.  Models and 
simulations are not adequate for SOA security evaluation.  
Measured variables from actual SOA operations on live 
networks need to be assessed and documented.  SOA 
Evaluation Architecture (SEA) was developed to help assess 
security in distributed SOA, including delineation of SOA 
variables and their associated security risk metrics.   As a test 
facility for SOA, SEA has implemented both enterprise-class 
and best-of-breed SOA solutions, in multiple configurations.  
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) presents an 
opportunity to significantly increase overall information 
technology effectiveness and performance, while 
substantially reducing hardware, software, and programming 
costs.  However, as with any new technology, there will be 
unforeseen costs and risks.  Security is one such category of 
risk and the impacts can be considerable – from external 
threats, and from internal processes – an example of which is 
documented in this report.  When fully developed, SEA will 
provide hard data for assessments of new services, quality of 




As an example of utility, consider SOA software 
applications and composite applications.  SOA software 
applications are defined as services that can be called from 
other applications on other servers, using machine-to-
machine (M2M) communications [1].  In theory, a service 
that has been once defined can be connected to service 
consumers with very little effort.  This situation will lead to 
an overall increase in network use, which will in turn lead to 
increasingly complex interactions [2].  Security analysis will 
need to address services, components, objects, and data 
types [3, 4].  Service level security contracts will need to 
formalize component relationships, object interactions, and 
associated rules [5]. 
So, while SOA dramatically reduces information 
production costs through shared resources [6],  and there is a 
significant increased efficiency from shifting information 
management responsibilities closer to those responsible for 
accuracy of the data, the cumulative savings are somewhat 
offset by increased costs to upgrade the network and security 
systems to support SOA. 
Services can build upon one another to form composite 
applications.  For example, several different services—each 
providing information on a different track or target—could 
be assembled into a composite service that displayed all 
tracks and associate data from the different sources.  Since 
the data is sent in XML format, the composite service can 
additionally parse the cumulative data, add additional logic, 
and provide the unified resource as a single service—which 
can in turn be published for others to use. 
Composite services should provide composite service 
users with a level of service integration that had previously 
been cost-prohibitive.  The SOA composite application 
approach, however, introduces complexity and security risk, 
as a failure at any step of the process could render the results 
incorrect, or vulnerable.  Such failures have been a common 
occurrence in recent operational experiments. 
To describe the intended assessment of SOA through 
SEA, this paper examines contemporary widely used models 
and components for SOA implementation.  This includes 
variables and options within each SOA model and 
component, and discusses considerations for operational, 
technical, and security assessment. 
For a Fleet implementation, several operational 
assumptions have been used during this analysis:  
1. Current Navy SOA implementations are disjointed, 
resulting in cost over-runs; absence of comprehensive 
functioning architectures has resulted in “stovepipe” 
SOAs and also resulted in integration requirements that 
arguably negate expected cost benefits and efficiencies. 
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2. Significant cost reductions for information technology 
hardware, software and personnel can be achieved using 
SOA and supporting technologies (such as virtualization 
and cloud computing with its shared storage, memory, 
and CPUs).  However, such reductions cannot be 
achieved given current implementation patterns. 
3. Technical capabilities of the Navy could increase 
greatly by SOA automation of currently manual 
information processes, and by SOA mediated 
customization of content and user interfaces. The SOA 
Software as a Service (SaaS) model could reduce costs 
for software modifications and customizations across the 
entire software life-cycle—if effectively implemented.  
SOA support by cloud computing environments could 
reduce costs, increase information technology 
effectiveness, and significantly reduce security risks.   
4. SOA design can support both comprehensive backbone 
services and forward deployed networks with 
specialized, flexible configurations for platforms and 
units.  Effective design requires recognition that 
different SOA models are required to accommodate 
different applications.  
Additionally, functional requirements are assumed in 
this analysis: 
A. Security will be a foremost concern since compromise 
of a SOA and its machine-to-machine processes would 
compromise every service and server across that SOA.  
Virtualization technologies increase technical 
efficiencies but also introduce a new and unknown level 
of security risk.  Cloud computing offers the potential to 
significantly reduce maintenance and security costs but 
would also introduce the possibility of a simultaneous 
cloud-wide security breach. 
B. Operations will necessitate distributed SOA and nodes 
that remain fully operational even during 
communication outages—with SOA able to synchronize 
content without operator involvement when 
communications are restored.  Multiple levels of SOA 
will be required to meet the needs of the Navy; a “one-
size fits all” approach to SOA would not be in the best 
interests of the Navy. Different operational units may 
require different types of SOA to meet their operational 
needs and communication contexts. 
 
SEA TEST ARCHITECTURE 
This paper describes an instance of the above 
architecture type as implemented in hardware in the SEA 
environment.  SEA uses actual DON link measurements and 
commercial SOA to generate realistic SOA behaviors. 
Major facets of SEA have been tested in fleet operations.  
SOA is applied by DOD as an integral component of the 
Global Information Grid (GIG), by DISA as Net-Centric 
Enterprise Services (NCES), by Navy through FORCEnet 
and CANES, by the Air Force as C2 Constellation, and by 
the Army within Future Combat Systems (FCS).  The SEA 
test environment can evaluate DON applications, both 
deployed and backbone (“cloud”).   
In Figure 1, the number “1” nodes are the “cloud” data 
centers on the backbone, the number “3” nodes the ship and 
forward-deployed units with limited bandwidth and 
communications, and the number “2” nodes the at-sea 
configurations that provide intermediary services.  Number 
“2” nodes are typically located in a network operations 


















Figure 1. SEA notional infrastructure. 
 
Specifically, a backbone SOA node, number “1”, is a 
comprehensive SOA that has been optimized for broadband 
communications and high availability.  Backbone SOA 
nodes would serve major commands, Maritime Domain 
Awareness (MDA) and Maritime Headquarters (MHQ), and 
provide the Navy interface to the Global Information Grid 
(GIG).  Shore-based sites would include Europe and other 
locations with a major Network Operating Center (NOC) 
and robust, high availability communications.   
Second tier service communications are not as robust as 
a backbone SOA, but try to provide continuous online 
communications with shore nodes.  Examples would include 
the reliable movement of information over unreliable links.  
Rules would be established to carry only real-time, strategic, 
tactical, and operational information on the second tier, 
while high-level policy, reference and archival information 
remain ashore, on tier 1 [assuming that rules and policies are 
necessary to optimize communications but a complicating 
variable when scaling SOA].  
Third tier communications, identified with the number 
“3”, are both low bandwidth and unreliable.  SOA optimized 
for track- and target- prioritized communications over low 
bandwidth links would be used by smaller platforms in a 
battle group,  by submarines, and by shore groups with 
second- or third-tier communications (such as USMC 
tactical units).  Initial SEA tests simulated all three tiers of 
Figure 1 above, and integrated infrastructure services (such 
as directory and security services).  
SOA for each afloat or deployed unit will assure 
continued information processing when communications are 
down, and will also provide an ability to synchronize both 
content and infrastructure services after communications are 
restored.  Content synchronization among distributed SOA 
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nodes adds considerable complexity and risk to scaling, and 
was simulated in the tests below to assess risk because of its 




Figure 2. Notional model of registry, repository, security. 
 
In Figure 2, circled letters are implementation types, 
with the backbone nodes “A” and “B” to provide the 
comprehensive suite of SOA components and services.  
These implementations would be in “cloud” data centers, 
access the comprehensive directories and security systems, 
and maintain the master metadata repository.  Letter “C” 
indicates a system with second tier communications 
capabilities, likely the carrier in a battle group or other 
platform that serves as the battle group network center.  
Letter “D” would be bandwidth-challenged environments. 
Note that many of the DOD and Navy systems do not 
use a “full stack” of SOA infrastructure services.  Some 
have a custom set of SOA infrastructure, specific to the 
applications.   Others have only web services.  Some 
technology sponsors offer a customized or “reduced stack” 
SOA that lacks traditional core SOA capabilities (e.g., to 
optimize throughput in bandwidth-limited environments).  
For example, sensor data for Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) may flow over a limited bandwidth 
link; Common Operational Picture (COP) applications may 
be legacy; MDA biometric data may be transposed to XML, 
and then processed through a partial SOA stack. 
In the tested architecture, security and directory services 
are managed centrally from a “primary node”, with 
provisions for backup and live failover.  In more detail, 
there are three (3) general levels of coordination required for 
SOA-to-SOA synchronization.  The first level contains 
security and directory services that identify users and 
authorize their information access.  The second level 
coordinates application flows through and across SOAs, 
generally through the Enterprise Service Bus or a similar 
technology.  The third and last level contains the content 
synchronization achieved at the storage, database, or 
application layers.  A glimpse into this complexity, as 
implemented in the SEA test environment, is presented in 
Figure 3 – which expands Figure 2 to show how ship 
deployed and battle command SOA were integrated in SEA.  
Security is implemented across SOA nodes, between SOA 
nodes, and at every service integration point.   
In Figure 3, clouds labeled with the number “1” are 
single node, stand-alone SOA, for example a backbone data 
center.  Domain controllers can route information to each 
cloud’s physical location, process “A” in the diagram. 
Security services are integrated to provide users and 
machines with single sign-on (SSO) across clouds – process 
“B”.  Ongoing efforts in the DOD address comprehensive 
SOA security but to date there is no DOD standard.  Several 
options were explored in the SEA project.  Process “C” 
denotes end-to-end security for web services.  Each of these 
processes, “A”-“C”, is needed for communications in a 
secure SOA DOD environment.  
Security and user directory integration are one of the 
most labor consuming facets of systems integration, and 
will be an issue when scaling SOA.  Specific techniques are 
required to integrate and synchronize user privileges for 
web services, applications, and content when integrating 
SOA nodes. These specific techniques are neither well 
established nor proven, especially for the hybrid SOA 
models common in the DOD.  An ESB serves as the 
application router for SOA and techniques to integrate the 
ESBs of both similar and dissimilar SOA (illustrated as 
processes “D”-“F”) will present a challenge (as addressed in 
OASIS reference document SOA-RM [7]).  Security setting 
propagation between applications through the ESB is 
similarly complex.   
The node or cloud designated with the number “3” in 
Figure 3 presents a mobile “reduced” SOA, without the full 
interoperability or integration stack.  In addition to the 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), 
Common Operational Picture (COP), and Maritime Domain 
Awareness (MDA) examples given above – which  require 
either hybrid or custom SOA – a similar “slimmed down” 
approach is sometimes used commercially.  Analogs from 
the commercial sector would include online transaction 
processing that uses real-time servers to process thousands 
of simultaneous transactions per second.  Examples of such 
online transaction processing include the Automated Teller 
Machine (ATM) inputs for a bank, and Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID) scan inputs for a large retailer.  The 
military analog would be processing fused data into sensor 
tracks for a command and control system.   
Data analysis is at the other extreme from real time 
processing and high bandwidth data streams. Data analysis 
involves a few users, each running resource-intensive 
services.  An example would be real-time data stream 
mining, perhaps for analysis of transactions. The military 
analog would be intelligence analysis that synthesizes large 
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sets of real-time data to estimate future intentions [e.g., of a 
terrorist group]. 
The command ship “2” in Figure 3 represents the 
integration point (at sea) for battle group operations, and the 
backbone SOA node “D” represents the integration point 
(on land) for operations across all Fleets.  Node or cloud “2” 
depicts a configuration appropriate for a command ship.  In 
configuration this node is smaller than a backbone node, but 
is larger and has more components than the forward-
deployed, reduced stack SOA.  Node “2” is optimized for 
communication, able to act as the integration point for a 
battle group, and is the interface with the shore backbone 
“D”.  This sea-based SOA, given best-available 
communications to shore, would collect data from forward-
deployed units and ships in a battle group (such as “3”), and 
send data back to them.  We simulate communications 
within the battle group that are independent of satellites. 
 
SEA TEST ENVIRONMENT 
 
Now that available features have been presented, 
consider a case study of their application.   
A. Case Study 
In this case study, a fairly realistic SOA system is loaded 
until latencies become excessive, at which point the above 
available features are used to determine what SOA 
component caused the excessive latency failure.   
1) General approach 
In building a SOA, one useful assessment technique is to 
take a baseline then re-test as components are added to see if 
any latency has changed.  If the new latencies are accepted, 
then those new latency measures become new baselines.  
When new web services are added they are referenced 
against the new baseline, and so on.  In this manner it is 
possible to determine, at an early stage, when something has 
gone awry with the SOA at the infrastructure level. We will 
apply this general technique to a security component, and 
then assess the security implications. 
The initial test architecture is presented in Figure 4 and 
includes an ESB, BPM, Rules Engine, and Security 
framework –choreographed through BPEL.  The diagram is 
substantially accurate but omits two items: the UDDI 
Registry and the BPM suite.  Neither is essential to 
understanding the test.  
The baseline test configuration was complex enough to 
be realistic. It featured managers and control centers for 
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both Grid and virtualization. It also contained fixed and 
mobile hosts and clients, wireless and broadband hard-wired 
lines, and both firewalled and LAN connections, as show in 




Figure 4. SEA preliminary test node configuration. 
2) Equipment and software, to include load generation. 
Oracle Fusion Middleware with BPEL, ESB, and a Rules 
engine were mounted on a BEA WebLogic application 
server, which was in turn mounted to an Oracle database.  
Sun Java Server was used for the tests.  Governance was 
handled through an Oracle web services Policy Manager. 
The test scenario employed a web service tier and 
messaging process flow through a workflow automation 
application.  Coordination was through BPEL, a Rules 
Engine, ESB, and Business Activity Monitor (BAM).  
These components comprised the load-set for the 
experiment.  Users and processes were then scaled – at 
different bandwidths, with different loads on those 
bandwidths.  All processes were operating within 
manufacturer specifications.   
 
 
Figure 5. SEA test scenario workflow. 
 
The test loaded the Figure 4 network, and compared loaded 
latencies against the unloaded initial baseline ranges to 
assess loaded performance.  Loads included user submission 
of data through a web service data form interface, 
automated and manual workflows for approvals, and 
external processing through the BPEL, Rules Engine, and 
ESB.  Processes were monitored through the BPEL console, 
ESB, and BAM.  Simulated user data was filed to a 
directory and, through an adapter, processed into the ESB – 
where it was fed back into a BPEL system and BAM 
(Figure 5):  
 
(1) User data submitted through a form interface 
(2) BPEL data, processed under pre-defined rules 
(3) Real time data, monitored by a BPEL in real-time 
(4) User input data, automatically archived as XML 
(5) Files, routed by the ESB to BPEL and BAM  
 
This workflow was selected for testing because it offered 
direct parallels to several of the tactical planning 
applications currently being tested in Sea Trial experiments. 
The general workflow is as follows: After data input, 
automated processes make decisions such as firing on a 
target, or making an acquisition. These decisions are subject 
to manual approval before implementing the decision.  This 
specific workflow was also selected because it was designed 
by the software’s vendors, so there can be some assurance 
of proper coding practices and quality control.  
3) Procedure 
After completion of the workflow setup procedure, and 
several successful runs of the workflow [which included 
both automated and human decision points], the system was 
loaded and placed into a stress test.  The stress test was to 
assess overall security and performance latencies under 
medium load.  In addition, the WS-Security open standard 
was enabled, with security information in the header of all 
SOAP messages. 
The initial runs of the stress test imposed a light 
workload and proceeded without incident.  Ten (10) 
processes were enacted concurrently, with each process 
regenerating five (5) times (Figure 6) to approximate user 
and load scaling over time.  A latency of 1000ms was 
established between the users and the servers through 
network impairment software to approximate medium-
latency satellite communications.  Stress test configuration 
settings were left at the software vendor’s default. The tests 
were without incident, and as shown in Figure 6, completed 
within an average of 784ms, with minimum of 117ms and 
maximum of 1797ms. 
Next, workload was tripled over the previous test.  The 
system was loaded with three (3) cascading batch jobs (in-
lieu of the 1 previous), with each job consisting of 10 
processes, each regenerating 5 times.  The SOA slowed by 
an order of magnitude, as documented in “Instance 2 stress 
test aggregate reports” (Figure 6).  The average process time 
increased more than tenfold (10x) to render the system 
nearly unusable. Minimum latency was similar, but 
maximum latency was about twenty (20x) larger for a very 
significant difference in overall processing rate. System logs 
revealed a token (security) error during verification, likely 
from latency in the certification process under load.  
Significant latency in retrieval from the data store was 
evident at service invocation.   
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Figure 6.   Test results: Security error and latency. 
 
Discussion 
1. A fully operational SOA, with a manufacturer-supplied 
workflow process, operating within manufacturer 
specifications, was base-lined then given a stress test. 
2. Latencies were measured on “best-of-suite” 
manufacturer-integrated, loosely-coupled components. 
3. Manufacturer integration was expected to be efficient.  
Third party systems integration was not required so can 
be ruled out as a causal factor in stress induced failure.   
4. Under light load, a moderately complex workflow 
operated normally with no errors or rogue processes.   
5. Stress tests were enacted.  The initial stress test loaded 
the SOA workflow by simulating intensive interaction 
by 10 users, each user conducting multiple tasks.  The 
SOA operated without incident.   
6. A second stress test simulated 30 simultaneous users, 
each invoking multiple web services.  Under this load, 
excessive latency was measured in the data store 
responsible for holding and parsing the security token.   
7. Examination of the logs revealed an error somewhere in 
the security process related to a security token. 
Some further explanation is warranted.  As previously 
discussed, security is the most complex facet of a SOA and 
the area most likely to generate problems.  This has been 
shown repeatedly in SOA experiments in Fleet operations.  
Also to know is that when a process fails, or a small sub-
process in this case, that failure may not be obvious to users. 
Failure does not simply kill the workflow or application.  
Rather, a Java routine known as “garbage collection” 
automatically kills the process, but can then attempt to 
recover from the error by restarting the process.  Users may 
not even be aware that a process has failed, only that a 
particular function has been slower in a given instance.  
Often network latency is blamed for delays when in reality a 
Java process is attempting to compensate for an error.  To 
optimize SOA operations, reasons for these failures should 






Investigation of SOA problems generally requires 
forensic analysis.  Such analysis for SOA or web service 
operations is extremely rare in the DON and its execution 
requires personnel with networking, systems administration, 
and SOA practical experience.  Forensics is also very time-
consuming, especially when the problem is intermittent.  In 
this example, an educated guess would be that the 
cumulative stress tests compounded and overloaded the 
security system.  Basically, the CPUs could process faster 
than the token could be passed or authenticated.  
Considerable additional testing would be needed to validate 
this hypothesis.  At a minimum, security issues are very 
significant for any SOA in which all data must be encrypted 
and secured, and for SOAs which must support large 
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